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DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 52D ARTILLERY GROUP
APO 96318
AVGG-OP 10
November 1968
SUBJECT: Operational
Report of 52d Artillery Group for Period Ending 31 October 1968 (RCS-CSFOR-65)
(R1)(U)
See Distribution
1. (C) Section 1,
Operations: Significant Activities.
a. The 52d Artillery
Group and attached units continue mission of providing artillery fire
support to US, ARVN and other South Vietnamese forces in the Central
Highlands II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Organization of 52d Artillery
Group at the close of the reporting period is shown in Inclosure 1.
(1) Significant
Organization Changes:
(a) Temporary attachments:
Battery C, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery; 191800H Aug 68 for an indefinite
period
(b) Temporary detachments:
1. Battery C,
3d Battalion, 6th Artillery; 261500H July for an indefinite period.
2. Battery C,
5th Battalion, 22d Artillery; 050830H Aug 68 for an indefinite period.
(2) Support Activities:
(a) The following
units continue to support the 4th Infantry Division in Operation MacArthur:
1. 1st Battalion,
92d Artillery (155mm Towed).
2. 3d Battalion,
6th Artillery(-) (105mm SP).
3. 5th Battalion,
22d Artillery(-) (175mm/8" SP).
4. 6th Battalion,
14th Artillery (175mm/8" SP).
5. Battery C,
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175mm/8" SP).
6. 237th, 243d
253d, 254th and 256th Field Artillery Radar Detachments (AN/MPQ-4).
7. 4th Section,
8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery (AN/MPQ-10).
(b) The 77th FA
Det (Radar) continued to provide countermortar radar support for
the Pleiku Defense Sector.
(c) Battery B,
3d Battalion, 6th Artillery and Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
were rotated from field locations to Artillery Hill (ZA2253), to
provide a battery of 105mm or 155mm in general support of the Pleiku
Defense Sector. Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, 4th Infantry
Division was assigned mission of GS Pleiku Defense Sector at the
beginning of the reporting period.
b. Intelligence Activities:
(1) Exchange of
Information.
(a) Daily liaison
visits were made by the S2 to other intelligence agencies in the Pleiku
area, i.e., Pleiku Sector S2, CO B, 5th Special Forces Group, and
II Corps G2 Advisor. Daily and weekly intelligence summaries were
also exchanged with these offices.
(b) During the reporting
period the 52d Artillery Group maintained liaison sections with each
of the Brigades of the 4th Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division
Artillery, 24th Special Tactical Zone, Kontum Province Headquarters,
Darlac Province Headquarters, 3d ARVN Cavalry Squadron, 2d Squadron,
1st Cavalry and Company B, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). These
liaison sections provided the group and higher headquarters with timely,
accurate intelligence information.
(2) Air Observation:
(a) The 52d Artillery
Group received 01 Aircraft support from the 3d Platoon, 219th Aviation
Company. Air observation was provided to support 4th Infantry Division's
Task Force Bright during the period 13 September 68 to 22 October
68. Three aircraft were based at Ban Me Thuot City Airfield to provide
this support. Remaining aircraft were used for target acquisition,
convoy coverage, and visual reconnaissance in the 1st and 3d Brigade,
4th Infantry Division AO's. To insure maximum effectiveness and coverage
of MacArthur AO, daily coordination of aircraft flight areas was made
with Pleiku Sector S2 Air and 4th Infantry Division G2 Air.
(b) An Aerial Observer
Training Course was conducted from 23 September 1968 to 26 September
1968 by 3d Platoon, 219th Aviation Company to train observers from
52d Artillery Group and Pleiku Sector in the techniques of aerial
observation. This course included instruction on requesting and adjusting
artillery fire.
(3) Forward Observers
52d Artillery Group
continued to provide forward observer support to 4th Infantry Division
operations. Forward observers have also been committed with Special
Forces and ARVN operations on numerous occasions during the quarter.
Liaison with Kontum and Pleiku Provinces and Special Forces has provided
advance knowledge of planned operations permitting forward observers
to be committed in support of these operations whenever required.
Forward observers were provided for 23d ARVN Division, 24th STZ, Company
B, 5th Special Forces Group, and the 4th Infantry Division.
(4) Operations -
Intelligence Communications Net
The operations -
intelligence AM radio teletype (AM/RTT) net, initiated last quarter,
was augmented during this reporting period by a single sideband (voice)
net. This net has provided continuous communications with distant
locations. Situations reports, intelligence summaries, spot reports
and logistic reports were exchanged on a daily basis.
c. Operations and
Training
(1) Plans
(a) 52d Artillery
Group Oplan 2-67, with 79 Frag Orders, remains in effect. Missions
of the Group are:
1. To provide
additional fire support to the 4th Infantry Division.
2. To provide
fire support to US and ARVN Special Forces in the Central Highlands.
3. To provide
fire support to all ARVN, Regional, Popular and Revolutionary Development
Forces in the Central Highlands.
4. To provide
technical support and assistance to selected ARVN units.
5. To provide
technical support and assistance to Special Forces Camps that have
artillery.
6. To coordinate
US Artillery in the Pleiku Defense Sector.
7. To conduct
the IFFORCEV Artillery Fire Direction Officer School.
8. To provide
forward observers and liaison officers to Company B, 5th Special
Forces Group, 4th Infantry Division and ARVN Artillery units.
9. To assume control
of other IFFORCEV Artillery units as directed.
(2) Operations
(a) 52d Artillery
Group engaged in tactical operation 92 day during the reporting period.
52 Artillery Group Headquarters did not conduct any tactical or administrative
move. Attached units were moved frequently throughout the area of
operations. as dictated by the tactical situation and in response
to requirements to reinforce 4th Infantry Division Artillery.
1. At the beginning
of the reporting period, 52d Artillery Group units were deployed
as follows:
(a) Six heavy
batteries:
Battery
B, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, at Ben Het (YB873257) GS; Battery
A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery at Plei Djereng (YZ876455) GS;
Battery C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, at Mary Lou (ZA227836)
GS; Battery A, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery at Suoi Doi (BR036534)
GS; Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery, at Oasis (ZA108273)
GS; Battery B, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery at Ban Me Thuot (AQ873017)
GSR 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery.
(b) Three medium
batteries:
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery at FSB-6 (YB873257) GS;
Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery at FSB Irma Jay (ZA151924)
GSR 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery; and Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92d
Artillery at Ban Me Thuot (AQ776182) GSR 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery.
(c) Three light
batteries:
Battery A, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery at ZA180160, DS 2d Battalion,
8th Infantry; Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery at YA896369,
DS 1-10 Cavalry; and Battery C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery at LZ
Salem (BR938803) DS 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.
2. In early August
the enemy situation in AO Dan Thang Mc Lain required one heavy battery
to provide heavy artillery coverage in the Phan Thiet area. Battery
C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery displaced from Oasis (ZA108273)
on 5 Aug 68 and was temporarily attached to the 5th Battalion, 27th
Artillery. A fire support coordinating element from 5th Battalion,
22d Artillery and metro section from 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery
accompanied Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery. The unit arrived
at Qui Nhon 8 Aug and departed by ship 9 Aug 68 for Phan Thiet.
3. The departure
of Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery from the Oasis necessitated
the formation of a provisional, three gun, composite heavy battery
taking one gun each from the heavy batteries at Plei Djereng (8
inch), LZ Mary Lou (175mm), and Suoi Doi (175mm). This battery was
constituted 4 Aug 68 and designated Battery D, 6th Battalion, 14th
Artillery (Prov). Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery
assumed operational control of Battery D, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery
on 6 Aug 68.
4. Near the middle
of August intelligence indicated increased enemy activity in Pleiku
and Kontum Provinces with an increased ambush threat along highway
14N in vicinity of Plei Mrong (ZA120675). To counter this threat,
one heavy battery was displaced from AO Crid to AO Binh Tay - MacArthur.
Battery C, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery arrived Artillery Hill
ZA228534) 19 Aug 68 and was temporarily attached to 52d Artillery
Group. Additional actions to counter the threat were to assign Battery
B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP) the mission of GS Pleiku
Defense Sector to provide light, quick reacting, self-propelled
artillery to be employed as required along highway 14N. Battery
A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, was released from mission of GS
Pleiku Defense and assumed mission of DS 1-10 Cavalry on 14 Aug
68.
5. During this
period of increased enemy activity along highway 14N, Battery B,
3d Battalion, 6th Artillery conducted 11 hipshoots. On 16 Aug 68,
the daily north bound convoy was ambushed and Battery B, 3d Battalion,
6th Artillery fired 251 rounds in support. Battery C, 6th Battalion
14th Artillery expended 34 rounds. The ambush attempt failed, and
41 NVA were KIA. On 20 Aug 68, the 403d ARVN Scout Company made
contact with the enemy in 24th Special Tactical Zone (STZ) operation
Binh Tay 6. 52d Artillery Group provided a liaison party on 22 Aug
68 to assist 24th STA in artillery fire planning and control during
Binh TAy 6 operation. Battery C, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery expended
2033 rounds from 20 Aug to 2 Sep 68 in support of the operation.
6. At the end
of August intelligence reports indicated a significant enemy buildup
in the Duc Lap area with indications that the Duc Lap Special Forces
Camp was an intermediate enemy objective prior to launching an attack
on Ban Me Thuot city. To counter this possibility, the 4th Infantry
Division formed Task Force Bright with additional maneuver elements
from 173d Airborne Brigade augmenting elements of 2d and 3d Brigades,
4th Infantry Division. On 10 Sep 68, 52d Artillery Group dispatched
an operations element to Duc Lap to assist in establishing a Fire
Support Coordination Center. The Tactical Command Post of 5th Battalion,
22d Artillery displaced to Duc Lap and the Commanding Officer, 5th
Battalion, 22d Artillery established an FSCC. Battery C, 1st Battalion,
92d Artillery was also displaced to Duc Lap. Other Artillery units
controlled by the fire support element were: Battery C, 3d Battalion,
319th Artillery, 173d Airborne Brigade; Battery B, 2d Battalion,
9th Artillery; and Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, 4th
Infantry Division.
7. In mid-September
an enemy threat reappeared in the Pleiku Province with intelligence
indicating an enemy buildup in the vicinity of Plei Mrong. 52d Artillery
Group units were displaced to provide artillery coverage for 3d
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division maneuver elements in the area. Units
wee positioned as follows: Tactical Command Post, 3d Battalion,
6th Artillery, Plei Mrong Airfield (ZA115673); Battery B, 3d Battalion,
6th Artillery, Plei Mrong Airfield (ZA115673); Battery C, 7th Battalion,
15th Artillery, Plei Mrong Airfield (ZA115673); and 237th Radar
Detachment, Plei Mrong Airfield (ZA115673).
8. Enemy activity
subsided during the latter part of September and October. 52d Artillery
Group units were positioned to provide mutual support to 4th Infantry
Division units. Battalion Tactical Command Posts were collocated
with Brigade Headquarters: 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery with 1st
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division; 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery with
3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division; and 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery
with 2d Brigade 4th Infantry Division. 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery
maintained a Tactical Command Post at Artillery Hill. Battery C,
7th Battalion, 15th Artillery was displaced to Oasis (ZA108273)
and Battery D, (Provisional) 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery was disbanded
on 4th October 68. This action provided balanced Heavy artillery
coverage in the Pleiku and Kontum Provinces.
9. In mid-October
the threat in the Ban Me Thuot and Duc Lap area decreased. Elements
of 173d Airborne Brigade were released and returned to parent organization
control. 4th Infantry Division Task Force Spoiler (Ban Me Thuot)
was dissolved on 25th October 68.
10. During the
same period intelligence estimates indicated an enemy buildup west
of Duc Co (YA843255). 4th Infantry Division organized Task Force
Dragoon in vicinity of Duc Co. 52d Artillery Group supported the
Duc CO buildup with Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery. Company
B, 5th Special Forces Group conducted operation White Elephant 22
in an area of operations 15 kilometers south of Duc Co. 52d Artillery
Group supported with a 175mm Platoon from Battery C, 7th Battalion,
15th Artillery. The operation terminated on 19 October 68 with negative
results. 175mm Platoon, Battery C, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery
returned to LZ Oasis (ZA108273) on 20 October 68 to support 3d Brigade,
4th Infantry Division.
11. During the
latter part of October enemy movements and significant sightings
increased in the 1st and 3d Brigades, 4th Infantry Division area
of operation. With enemy activity at a low level in the 2d Brigade
area of operation, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was returned to 3d
Brigade, 4th Infantry Division area of operation. 5th Battalion
22d Artillery established a Combined Fire Support Coordinating Center
(FSCC) to control artillery fires in the Ban Me Thuot area.
12. Other moves
during reporting period included 14 hipshoots conducted by Battery
A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery; Battery B, 5th Battalion, 22d
Artillery; Battery C, 7 Battalion, 15th Artillery and Battery C,
6th Battalion 14th Artillery to attack targets normally out of range
of heavy artillery. Battery A, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery occupied
16 positions providing direct support to 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry
(Mech). Battery B, 1st Battalion 92d Artillery displaced from FSB
Irma Jay on 4 September 1968 and occupied six positions during the
remainder of the period.
13. At the end
of October, 52d Artillery Group units were deployed as follows:
(a) Six heavy
batteries:
Battery
B, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, at Ben Het (YB873257) GS; Battery
C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, at Mary Lou (ZA227836) GS; Battery
A, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery at Suoi Doi (BR036534) GS; Battery
C, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (temporarily attached to 52d Artillery
Group) at Oasis (ZA108273) GS; Battery B, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery
at Ban Me Thuot (AQ873017) GS; and Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d
Artillery (temporarily attached 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery) at
Phan Thiet.
(b) Three medium
batteries:
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery at FSB-6 (YB873257) GSR
6th Battalion, 29th Artillery; Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
at Duc CO (YA844251) GSR 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery; and Battery
C, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery at Duc Lap (YU866770) GSR 2d Battalion,
9th Artillery.
(c) Three light
batteries:
Battery A, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery at FSB Puma (ZA079220) DS
2d Battalion, 8th Infantry; Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery
at Artillery Hill (ZA226536) GS Pleiku Defense Sector; and Battery
C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery at LZ Pony (BR933805) temporarily
attached to 41st Artillery Group.
(b) During the reporting
period the following firing batteries were evaluated by the 52d Artillery
Group firing battery evaluation team to verify that command policies
and sound artillery practices were being followed:
Battery B, 3d
Battalion, 6th Artillery - 3 Aug 68, Satisfactory
Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery - 10 Aug 68, Satisfactory
Battery C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery - 13 Aug 68, Satisfactory
Battery A, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery - 29 Sep 68, Satisfactory
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery - 6 Oct 68, Satisfactory
(C) The Group Commander,
Battalion Commanders, Group and Battalion Staffs made frequent liaison
visits to supported units during the reporting period to coordinate
plans for artillery support and to exchange tactical information and
intelligence. In addition the Commanding General I Field Force Vietnam
Artillery made periodic command visits to 52d Artillery Group and
attached units. Listed below are command visits and inspections of
special significance which were conducted during the reporting period.
1. On 20 August
1968, 52d Artillery Group was visited by BG Kornet, Director of
Ammunition, DA where he conferred with Commanding Officer, 52d Artillery
Group and toured the Pleiku Sub Area Command ammunition supply point
(ZA1952).
2. On 24 August
1968, Commanding Officer, 52d Artillery Group traveled to Ban Me
Thuot and met with BG Ahn, Commanding General, 23d ARVN Division
and COL Sage, Senior Advisor, 23d ARVN Division.
3. On 26 August
1968, a Command Inspection of 52d Artillery Group was conducted
by IFFV Artillery. A satisfactory rating was received.
4. On 27 August
1968, Commanding Officer, 52d Artillery Group accompanied BG Edwards,
Commanding General, IFFV Artillery to Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division and Headquarters, II Corps. The party received a briefing
and met and conferred with MG Stone, Commanding General, 4th Infantry
Division, MG Lu Lan, Commanding General, II Corps and COL (then
LTC) Williams, Commanding Officer, 4th Infantry Division Artillery.
5. On 8 October
1968, the Commanding General, IFFV Artillery and Commanding Officer,
52d Artillery Group attended the second quarterly II Corps Tactical
Zone Artillery Seminar conducted at II Corps Headquarters. The purpose
of the seminar was to further cooperation and progress among ARVN
and Allied Artillery in the II Corps Tactical Zone. Topics presented
were the Artillery assistance Program, Air Advisory, Ammunition
Management System, Effectiveness of Interdiction Fire, Defense of
Artillery Positions, and Combined Fire Support Coordination Centers.
(3) Training
(a) Training during
the period for Headquarters and Headquarters Battery personnel included:
1. Character Guidance
- 3 Hrs.
2. Code of Conduct - 1 Hr.
3. Command Information - 12 Hrs.
4. Civil Affairs - 1 Hr.
5. Subversion and Espionage Directed Against U.S. Army - 1 Hr.
6. Material Readiness - 1 Hr.
7. Safeguarding Defense Information - 1 Hr.
8. Survival, Evasion & Escape - 1 Hr.
9. Safety - 1 Hr.
10. First Aid - 1 Hr.
11. Preventive Medicine - 2 Hrs.
12. Crew Served Weapons - 2 Hrs.
13. Individual Weapons - 2 Hrs.
14. Individual Weapons Test Firing and Zero Confirmation - 6 Hrs.
(b) Command Inspections
of 52d Artillery Group units were conducted by Commanding Officer,
52d Artillery Group.
1. 6th Battalion,
14th Artillery - 15 Oct 68
2. Headquarters, & Headquarters Battery, 52d Artillery Group
- 19 Oct 68
3. 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery - 23 Oct 68
4. 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery - 29 Oct 68
(c) Fire Direction
Officers School:
1. During the
reporting period, the IFFORCEV Artillery Fire Direction School conducted
by 52d Artillery Group, trained 107 officers and 12 enlisted men.
Five ARVN officers from the 23d ARVN Division Artillery and II Corps
Artillery attended the course. The fire direction course is five
days in length and covers all facets of fire direction and includes
FADAC training and procedures peculiar to Vietnam.
2. Because of
large influx of officers during this quarter only one enlisted class
was conducted. Officers assigned to IFFORCEV Artillery, 4th Infantry
Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, and ARVN
artillery units attended the school.
3. The Fire Direction
School FACAC Assistance Team composed of one officer, and one enlisted
man visited all the artillery battalions in IFFORCEV Artillery,
the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 101st Airborne Division. The
FACAC Assistance Team provided instructional assistance on the tactical
and operational employment of FADAC in Vietnam.
(d) Artillery Assistance
Program:
During the reporting
period this headquarters and attached units provided technical assistance
to ARVN and Special Forces Artillery. Forward observers and liaison
officers were provided for numerous ARVN, Province and Special Forces
Operations.
1. Associate Battery
Program:
The Associate
Battery Program is one of the important links between ARVN units
and their advisors with US units. The program sponsored by this
headquarters links four artillery battalions of the 52d Artillery
Group with the 37th, 39th, 221st, and 222d ARVN Artillery Battalions
operating in the Central Highlands. The Associate Battery Program
allows US artillery units to provide ARVN artillery units with training,
technical, and maintenance assistance. On two occasions during the
reporting period this headquarters provided a towed 155mm battery
(B/1-92d Artillery) to support Operation Binh Tay 13 being conducted
by the 24th Special Tactical Zone. This support was unique because
the battery displaced to the ARVN command post position and located
adjacent to an ARVN artillery battery of the same caliber that was
supporting the operation. During these operations the ARVN artillery
was given the opportunity to observe a US firing battery and the
information passed between the two fire direction centers in the
form of meteorological data and registrations provided valuable
training for ARVN artillery.
2. Special Forces
Assistance:
52d Artillery
Group maintains a full time liaison section with Company B, 5th
Special Forces Group (Airborne). This liaison section has the primary
responsibility of coordinating artillery support for Mobile Strike
Force elements operating in the Central Highlands. This headquarters
conducted monthly training assistance visits to Special Forces camps
in the Central Highlands that have organic artillery. When a Special
Forces camp is issued organic 105 howitzers a 52d Artillery Group
training team assists in training camp personnel in all facets of
the howitzers as well as providing fire direction training. After
completion of the initial training, monthly training assistance
visits are conducted by the group training team.
3. Artillery Assistance
to RF/PF Program:
Assistance to
RF/PF program is closely associated with the 52d Artillery Group
liaison efforts in Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac Province. In the three
Province Headquarters the group LNO;s work closely with the RF/PF
advisors to coordinate fire request channels and defensive concentrations
for RF/PF elements. During this reporting period forward observer
training was conducted for 40 RF/PF personnel in Kontum and Darlac
Provinces.
(c) A combined II
Corps Artillery, 52d Artillery Group firepower demonstration was conducted
24 October 1968. The effectiveness of firecracker and beehive ammunition
was demonstrated. The Commanding Officer 52d Artillery Group welcomed
the Commanding General II Corps, and Staff members of 4th Infantry
Division and II Corps.
d. Logistics:
(1) During September
it was learned that the personnel bunkers at fire support base Mary
Lou did not meet the minimum safety distance from the ASP at that
location. Coordination was made with the 937th Engineer Group and
arrangements were made for Engineer Support in relocating the facilities
in question.
(2) The 62d Maintenance
Battalion (direct support) anticipates a shortage of maintenance personnel
during November. To keep maintenance from falling below desired standards,
a program was initiated during October to offer additional training
to artillery maintenance personnel. After this training, these personnel
will be authorized to perform third echelon maintenance. This will
be for a temporary period only.
(3) During the months
of September and October, replacement M1087 engines were difficult
to obtain. Modified M107 engines used as substitutes did not work.
These engines overheated very easily. The expected arrival of rebuilt
M108's beginning in November should eliminate this problem.
(4) On 27 Oct 68,
two M-36 chronographs were issued to 52d Artillery Group. The receipt
of the chronographs provided 52d Artillery Group an organic calibration
capability.
(5) Maintenance
Posture
Average Daily Deadline Rate by Month
Equipment Aug Sep Oct
Weapons 8.3% 7.5% 10.3%
Vehicles 5.0% 6.0% 7.0%
Radios 7.2% 9.4% 13.0%
Generators 11.0% 3.0% 11.6%
c. Civil Affairs
(1) Seven hundred
ninety two (792) patients were treated during the reporting period
through the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) conducted under
the provisions of the MEDCAP II Plan.
(2) Food and clothing
were distributed to the villages surrounding Pleiku.
(3) Nineteen thousand
three hundred sixty two (19,362) piasters were donated by personnel
of 52d Artillery Group to assist in the support of Pleiku Evangelical
Medical Clinic and the Christian Missionary Alliance Leprosarium.
(4) Over one hundred
and ten thousand (110,000) piasters of military supplies were contributed
in support of civic action projects.
(5) The school at
Lau Village (Montagnard) was provided materials, technical assistance
and transportation.
(6) 52d Artillery
Group assisted in obtaining a teacher for the Montagnard Reserve School
located at Dong Cha. Classes began on 5 Aug 68.
2. (C) Section 2.
Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation and Recommendations.
a. Personnel: None
b. Operations:
Split Batteries
(1) Observation:
The nature of present operation is such that batteries are often required
to split and fire as platoons in order to satisfy mission requirements.
This problem is particularly prevalent in heavy batteries that contain
a platoon of two 8" howitzers and a platoon of two 175mm guns.
(2) Evaluation:
The problem in splitting a heavy firing battery into two platoons
stems from the necessity to have two sets of personnel trained in
the key jobs; i.e., two FDC's, officers to be with each firing platoon;
and communication and ammunition personnel at two locations. When
the two platoons are widely separated and operating on a 24-hour basis,
the present austere TO&E of a battery creates many problems for
the commander. One problem is that of command and control. It is absolutely
essential that at least two officers, and Executive Officer and a
Fire Direction Officer, be present to control the platoon's operations
at all times. An around the clock mission requires four officers,
two in each platoon area. Heavy artillery TO&E 6-437G provides
six officers to each firing battery. However, two of these are forward
observers who are usually with maneuver elements. This leaves four
officers, including the Battery Commander to remain with one of the
platoons. This imposes a serious restriction on the Battery Commander
by not allowing him to supervise the overall mission and perform his
other duties. Other problems inherent in a split heavy battery are
the degradation of maintenance, logistical support, communications,
and the lack of sufficient TO&E equipment to support the split.
MTO&E's presently being revised, if approved, should alleviate
equipment shortages.
(3) Recommendations:
That heavy batteries not be split unless tactical necessity requires
heavy artillery coverage and no other solutions are feasible. If the
split is unavoidable, the firing battery should be temporarily augmented
with additional officer personnel to insure safe, sound artillery
procedures are followed.
c. Training: None
d. Intelligence: None
e. Logistics:
Conversion of M107
Engines.
(1) Observation:
Conversion of M107 engines to be used in the M108 caused additional
work load and increased the deadline period of the weapon.
(2) Evaluation:
During the reporting period several M108's were deadlined for M108
engines. Several M107 engines were converted and installed in the
M108. Due to difference in the cooling systems of the two vehicles,
the converted M107 engines overheated quickly and several burned out
with very low mileage. Once the converted M107 engine was installed
in the M108, the high priority for the M108 engine was canceled. After
burning out of the converted M107 engine, a new requisition had to
be initiated for a M107 engine. This added to the maintenance downtime
of the weapon.
(3) Recommendation:
That further study be made to determine what modifications should
be made to the cooling system of the M107 engine prior to placing
it in a M108 in order to make it compatible. Until this study results
in a modification, suggest that priority requisitions for M108 engines
not be canceled upon installation of a M107 engine, as this installation
is presently only a stopgap measure.
f. Organization: None
g. Other: None
3. Section 3, Headquarters
Department of the Army Survey Information: Evasion, Escape and Survival
- None
Jesmond D. Balmer, Jr.
Incl Colonel,
Artillery
as Commanding
DISTRIBUTION:
CINCUSARPAC ATTN: GPOP-DT - 2 cys
CG, USARV ATTN:
AVHGG (DST) - 3 cys
CG, IFFORCEV
ARTY ATTN: AVFA-AT-D - 5 cys
AVFA-AT-D (10 Nov
68) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Artillery Group for Period
Ending 31 October 1968 RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)
DA, HQ, I Field Force
Vietnam Artillery, APO 96350
TO: Commanding General,
I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350
This
headquarters has reviewed the attached Operational Report and concurs
with recommendations with the following comments:
a. Reference: Para
2b, page 11. Under present authorizations, temporary augmentation
with additional officer personnel is accomplished by using officers
assigned to other batteries and battalion/group staffs as appropriate.
b. Reference: Para
2e, page 12. Information received by this headquarters from 62d Mnt
Bn (DSU), indicates that this practice has been discontinued.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
Gearld
C. Young
Major,
Artillery
Adjutant
AVFA-GC-OT (10
Nov 68) 2d
Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 52d Artillery Group for Period
Ending 31 October 1968 RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)
DA, HEADQUARTERS,
I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350
TO: Commanding General,
United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
(U) This headquarters
has reviewed subject report and later indorsement and makes the following
comment: Reference paragraph 2a, page 12, Conversion of M107 Engines.
The practice of converting M107 engines to M108 engines has been suspended.
FOR
THE COMMANDER:
(?)
Cy furn:
IFFORCEV Arty
INCLOSURE 1
ORGANIZATION,
COMMAND AND STAFF
52d ARTILLERY GROUP
31 OCTOBER 1968
GROUP
COMMANDER: COL JESMOND D. BALMER, JR.
XO :
LTC DONALD L. McNUTT
S1 :
MAJ JAMES L. MILLER
S2 :
MAJ WAYLAND D. PARSONS
S3 :
MAJ WILLIAM R. ROTH
S4 :
MAJ THOMAS A. BROWN
HQ BTRY CO : CPT DONALD B. STEPHENS
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