DEPARTMENT
OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 92D ARTILLERY
APO 96318
AVGG-BJ 5
August 1969
SUBJECT: Operational
Report of the 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery for Period Ending 31 July
1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)
See Distribution
1. (C) Section 1,
Operations: Significant Activities.
a. (C) General:
(1) The 1st Battalion,
92d Artillery remains attached to the 52d Artillery Group, I Field
Force Vietnam Artillery, with its headquarters at Pleiku, Republic
of Vietnam and its Forward Command Post in Dak To, Republic of Vietnam,
operating in general support of US/RVNAF and FWMAF. The organization
has been continuously engaged in action against hostile forces in
the Area of Operations of the 24th Special Tactical Zone, in II Corps
Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam.
(2) Location, status
and mission of each unit organic to or OPCON to this battalion are
as follows:
(a) Forward Command
Post: Grid ZB005217 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); Organic; Coordinates
all types of fire support for Dak To and Dak Sut subsectors, tactically
controls organic and OPCON units and tactically directs fires.
(b) Battalion
Headquarters: Grid ZA226535 (Artillery Hill, Pleiku); organic; General
Support.
(c) Battery A(-):
Grid YA863265 (LZ Elaine): OPCON to 3rd Battalion, 6th Artillery,
General Support with priority for fires to 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry,
4th Infantry Division.
(d) Battery A
Platoon: Grid ZB005217 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); Organic; General
Support.
(e) Battery B:
Grid YB934187 (Fire Support Base 6, 7 KM west of Dak To); Organic;
General Support.
(f) Battery C(-):
Grid ZA028935 (LZ Bass, 22KM west of Kontum); OPCON to 6th Battalion,
14th Artillery; General Support.
(g) Battery C
Platoon: Grid YB869256 (Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het) 15 KM northwest
of Dak To; Organic; General Support
(h) Service Battery:
Grid ZA226535 (Artillery Hill, Pleiku) Organic: General Support.
(i) Battery A
Platoon, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery: Grid YB869256 (Fire Support
Base 12, Ben Het); OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; General Support.
(j) Battery B(-),
6th Battalion, 14th Artillery: Grid YB869256 (Fire Support Base
12, 15 KM northwest of Dak To); OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery;
General Support.
(k) Battery B
Platoon, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery: Grid ZB005216 (Fire Support
Base 1, Dak To); OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; General Support.
(l) Two (2) M-42's,
Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW): Grid ZB005217 (Fire
Support Base 1, Dak To); Direct Support of Fire Base 1.
(m) 2nd Platoon
(-), Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW): Grid YB869256
(Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het); Direct Support Battery B, 6th Battalion,
14th Artillery (which is OPCON 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery).
(n) Metro Section:
ZB005217 (Fire Support Base 1, Dak To); Organic; Supports Artillery
and weather service in Dak To/Ben Het area.
(o) 254th Radar
Detachment: Grid ZB054217 (42nd ARVN Compound, Tan Canh, 4 KM east
of Dak To); OPCON to 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery; Provide countermortar
surveillance for Dak To area.
(p) 4th Radar
Section, 8th Battalion, 26th Target Acquisition Battalion: Grid
YB869356 (Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het) OPCON 1st Battalion, 92nd
Artillery, provide countermortar surveillance for Ben Het area.
(3) The battalion
is organized under TO&E 6-425G, dated 31 October 1966, as modified
by MTO&E 6-425G dated 13 November 1968.
OFF
WO EM TOTAL
(a) Authorized 37 6 555 598
(b) Assigned 34 5 568 607
(4) There were
35 personnel in the Battalion wounded during the reporting period.
Of these 1 was from Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 1 was
from Service Battery, 23 were from Battery A, 9 were from Battery
C. Also the battalion, had nine men killed in action. PFC Porter,
PFC Burgess, SSG Kraft, PFC Weiser, PFC Davis, SP4 Connell, PFC
Carter of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, were killed by
hostile action. PFC Sisneros, Battery B, died of wounds caused by
an exploding breech block. SP4 Greco was on a Forward Observer mission.
b. Intelligence:
(1) Ground observations:
Ground observation was performed by the following forward observer
teams deployed with maneuver elements:
(a) Two (2) forward
observer teams were deployed on 05 May 1969. One team was with the
1st Battalion, 42d Regiment(ARVN) and the other team with the 3rd
Mobile Strike Force Battalion.
(b) One (1) forward
observer team was deployed on 08 May 1969 with the 4th Battalion,
42d Regiment(ARVN).
(c) On 12 May 1969
the forward observer team with 4th Battalion, 42d Regiment (ARVN)
was extracted and redeployed with the 22nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN).
Another team was deployed with the 4th Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN).
(d) On 15 May 1969
two (2) forward observer teams were deployed with the 3rd AVRN Cavalry
Squadron.
(e) On 20 May 1969
one (1) forward observer team was deployed with the 22nd Ranger Battalion
(ARVN).
(f) On 25 May 1969
four (4) forward observer teams were deployed. Teams were inserted
with 11th Ranger Battalion (ARVN), 23rd Ranger Battalion (ARVN), 3rd
Cavalry Squadron (ARVN) and 5th Mbile Strike Force.
(g) On 29 May 1969
a forward observer team was deployed with the 2nd Mobile Strike Force.
(h) On 03 June 1969
two (2) forward observer teams were deployed. One each with the 2nd
Battalion, 47th Regiment (ARVN), and the 4th Battalion, 42nd Regiment
(ARVN).
(i) On 04 June 1969
the 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion deployed with a forward observer
team.
(j) On 05 June 1969
a liaison officer/forward observer was deployed with the 22nd Ranger
Battalion (ARVN).
(k) On 11 June 1969
a liaison officer was sent to Dak To District subsector.
(l) On 13 June 1969
a forward observer was deployed with the 3rd ARVN Cavalry.
(m) On 16 June 1969
two (2) forward observer teams were deployed. These were with the
1st Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN) and the 2nd Battalion, 47th Regiment
(ARVN).
(n) On 17 June 1969
two (2) forward observer teams were deployed with the 5th Mobile Strike
Force Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 47th Regiment (ARVN).
(o) On 22 June 1969
a forward observer team was deployed with the 4th Battalion, 42nd
Regiment (ARVN).
(p) On 24 June 1969
a forward observer team was deployed with the 2nd Mobile Strike Force
Battalion.
(q) On 28 June 1969
two (2) forward observer teams were deployed with the 53rd Regiment
(ARVN). One team went with the 1st Battalion and the other went with
the 3rd Battalion.
(r) Two (2) forward
observer teams were deployed to Ben Het. One team manned the observation
tower and the other team observed from West Hill.
(s) On 05 July 1969
the forward observer team with the 1st Battalion, 47th Regiment (ARVN)
was exchanged.
(t) On 09 July 1969
a forward observer team was sent to Dak To district to fire in defensive
targets for friendly villages.
(2) Aerial observation:
Aerial observation was accomplished throughout the reporting period.
On 23 May 1969 two (2) C-1 aircraft (headhunters) with pilots and
Aerial Observer's were sent to Dak To on a permanent basis. This facilitated
aerial operations because the time usually spent flying from Kontum
or Pleiku each day could now be utilized as air observation time.
(3) Radar: Radars
were employed to assist the battalion in its operations. A total of
two (2) AN/MPQ-4 countermortar radars, one (1) AN/MPQ-10 countermortar
radar, one (1) AN/PPS-4 and one (1) AN/PPS-5 were employed. Those
units gave countermortar and also personnel movement coverage respectively.
The availability of these radars gave the battalion an excellent means
of target acquisition. Another distinct advantage is that registrations
could be conducted with the AN/MPQ-4 radar.
c. (C) Operations
and Training Activities.
(1) Operations.
(a) At the beginning
of the reporting period, Battery A(-), 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery,
was located at LZ Mary Lou (ZA223829), vicinity of Kontum with a mission
of General Support; OPCON 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, Battery A,
1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery, Platoon was at Ben Het, OPCON 1st Battalion,
92nd Artillery, with a mission of general support with priority of
fires to Ben Het counterbattery.
On 04 May the battery (-) moved to Fire Support Base 1, Dak To (ZB
003215) with the mission of general support 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery.
The Battery supported 24th Special Tactical Zone operations in Dak
To/Ben Het area.
On 09 May Fire Support Base 1 began receiving daily incoming enemy
fire (mostly 122mm rockets). During the next month 703 rounds of incoming
were received at Fire Support Base 1.
On 13 May a 122mm rocket landed approximately 5 feet from a manned
howitzer, resulting in 4 men killed in action and 11 men wounded in
action. Thirteen volunteers were flown in from base camp at Pleiku
that same night as temporary replacements. Daily the battery continued
to heroically operate under fire, supporting the maneuver elements
and returning accurate and effective counterbattery fire whenever
Dak To was attacked. In addition to large numbers of 122mm rockets
fired into the Dak To compound, recoiless rife fire was received against
the battery position.
On 27 May the battery (-) was assigned the mission of general support
with priority of fires to 2nd Ranger Group (ARVN) which was in continuous
contact. The mission of Battery A Platoon, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery
continued to be General Support with priority fires to Ben Het counterbattery.
On 28 May a CV-2 aircraft resupplying Ben Het by airdrop accidently
dropped a 55 gallon drum of fuel on one of Battery A Platoon's gun
bunkers. No casualties resulted, but the flash wall of the right side
of the bunder was destroyed and had to be rebuilt.
On 02 June the mission of Battery A (-) was changed to general support
with priority of fires to 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion.
On 04 June 1969 the mission was changed to general support with one
platoon in direct support of 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion.
On 04 June 1969 the battery had 2 men killed in action and 3 men wounded
in action as a result of incoming 75mm recoiless rifle fire. During
periods of incoming 122mm rocket fire, the enemy began to direct recoiless
rifle fire against the battery position area when the men manned the
howitzers to fire counterbattery.
On 05 June Battery A Platoon, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery took a
direct hit on a section bunker. No casualties resulted, but one bunker
was declared unsage and had to be rebuilt.
On 06 June Battery A Platoon, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery sustained
a direct hit on the powder bunker, resulting in the loss of 560 cannisters
of powder.
On 07 June section number 3 at Dak To had a flash wall destroyed by
a B-40 rocket.
On 09 June the battery's mission was changed to general support with
priority of fires of one platoon to 2nd Mobile Strike Force Battalion.
From 08 June to 12 June one platoon conducted a daily "hipshoot"
in order to be capable of firing counterbattery while Dak To was receiving
incoming.
On 08 June the Fire Direction Center at Ben Het received a direct
hit, resulting in only minor damage.
On 09 June Battery A Platoon had 6 men wounded in action as a result
of incoming 75mm recoiless rifle fire.
On 17 June one man was wounded in action from mortar fragments.
On 19 June the mission of Battery A(-) became general support with
priority of fires for one platoon to 4th Mobile Strike Force Battalion
and for the other platoon to the 5th Mobile Stike Force Battalion.
On 19 June the mission of Battery A(-) reeverted to general support.
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery (Platoon) sustained 3 hits
on gun bunkers on on 22 and 23 June, resulting in only superficial
damage.
On 23 June Battery A (Platoon) powder bunker sustained a direct hit
resulting in 5 men wounded in action, the loss of 350 cannisters of
white bag powder and destruction of the bunker.
On 26 June the crews of Battery A exchanged positions with the crews
of Battery C, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery (Platoon), at Dak To.
The howitzers remained in place. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery
was again together as a battery.
On 14 July Battery A moved 4 howitzers to Artillery Hill OPCON 3rd
Battalion, 6th Artillery.
On 15 July the Battery (-) was road marched to LZ Oasis and from there
to LZ Elaine where it had the mission of general support with priority
of fires to 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry.
(b) Battery B, 1st
Battalion, 92d Artillery was located at Fire Support Base 6 (YB933188)
throughout the reporting period.
On 04 May, 24th Special Tactical Zone began operating in the area.
Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery supported these operations
throughout the reporting period.
On 09 May, while engaged in a battalion time on target and massing
of fires on an enemy location on Fire Support Base 5, an explosion
at the breech end of a howitzer killed one man and wounded six. The
wounded were medically evacuated.
On 11 May the damaged howitzer was replaced by one from Battery C,
1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery.
On 11 May the one Civilian Irregular Defense Group company security
force was increased to two companies (Ben Het Civilian Defense Group
and Plateau GI Civilian Defense Group). The Mission of Battery B,
1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery was general support until 26 May when
it became general support with priority of fires to 1st Battalion,
42nd Regiment (ARVN).
On 04 June the mission was changed to general support with one platoon
direct support of 3rd Battalion, 42nd Regiment (ARVN).
On 08 June 1969 Fire Support Base 6 received 16 incoming 75mm recoiless
rifle rounds. One round hit the messhall and several hit an ammunition
bunker. There were no casualties during this attack. A UH-1 helicopter
landing at the time o fthe first attack was hit and crashed on the
helipad. Counterbattery fires from 3 batteries was massed in the area
from which the unit was receiving the recoiless fire.
The battery's mission reverted to general support on 09 June.
On 11 June Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery and Civilian Irregular
Defense Group's on Fire Support Base 6 came under attack by an NVA
company with sappers. Attack consisted of small arms fire, satchel
charges, concussion grenades, B-40 rockets, recoiless rifle and mortar
fire. Four (4) stachel charges exploded in the vicinity of number
6 howitzer section, but the section continued to fire throughout contact.
No US casualities nor damage was sustained. Two (2) individuals from
the Civilian Irregular Defense Group were slightly wounded in action.
Twenty-five NVA were killed in action; and many weapons captured in
action.
On 19 June the mission became general support with priority of fires
to 2nd Battalion, 47th Regiment(ARVN) and 3rd Battalion, 42nd Regiment
(ARVN).
On 05 July the battery's mission was changed to general support with
priority of fires to 22nd Ranger Battalion (ARVN).
On 09 July the mission reverted to general support.
During the last two weeks of the reporting period aerial resupply
has been difficult because of monsoon weather.
(c) Battery C, 1st
Battalion, 92d Artillery moved by road from Artillery Hill on 01 May
1969, to Plei Ring De (ZA 218351) OPCON 3rd Howitzer Battalion, 6th
Artillery with mission of general support.
02 May 1969
Battery C moved to Asphalt Plant (AR 896118)with mission of general
support.
On 01 June 1969 Battery C Platoon moved from Ashpalt Plant by road
to Fire Support Base Mary Lou (ZA 223829) OPCON 6th Battalion, 14th
Artillery with the mission ofgeneral support priority of fire for
the defense of Kontum.
On 24 June the Platoon moved by road to Dak To (ZB 004217); with the
mission of general support, Dak To/Ben Het area.
On 26 June 1969 Battery C(-) moved by road from the Asphalt Plant
to LZ Bass (ZA028935) and passed from OPCON of the 3rd Battalion,
6th Artillery to 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery with the mission of
general support priority of fires to 4th Infantry Division units.
(d) Towards the
end of April and the beginning of May 1969 intelligence indicators
pointed to a build up of NVA Forces in the Dak To/Ben Het area. It
was discovered that two infantry regiments and major portions of an
artillery regiment were present to the south of Ben Het, Fire Support
Base 6, and Dak To. The target appeared to be Dak To.
On 04 May 1969, 24th Special Tactical Zone established a Combined
Tactical Operations Center at Fire Support Base 1, Dak To in order
to control the troops being inserted into the area to counter the
enemy threat. The commander of the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery,
was designated the Fire Support Cooordinator for the Dak To/Ben Het
area of operations. The Dak To Combined Fire Support Coordination
Center under his control was to control the fires of not only US but
also all ARVN Artillery in the area. This would eventually evolve
into the equivalent of one Battalion Group; Fourty-one tubes of Field
Artillery and six Air Defense Artillery twin 40mm M-42's. The Fire
Support Coordination Center also coordinated all air fires, to include
B-52 Strikes, Forward Air Control directed Tactical Air Strikes, radar
directed combat sky spots and helicopter gunships.
During the period 04 May to 08 July this force coordinated over 150,000
rounds of Artillery, 1100 sorties of Forward Air Control directed
Tactical Air Control airstrikes 533 combat sky spots and 142 B-52
strikes. During this time 24th Special Tactical Zone employed nineteen
maneuver battalions, with as many as nine battalions committed at
one time. During the period, friendly elements killed more than 1800
enemy troops. Due to growing complexity of the organization and situation,
a Battalion Group was established on 09 June 1969. The Forward Command
Post remained at Dak To while 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery established
a Forward Command Post at Ben Het. Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion,
92nd Artillery was designated the Battalion Group Commander. During
the period of operations both Command Posts were subjected to intense
enemy fire and bot areas were subjected to sapper attacks.
(e) The Combined
Fire Support Coordination Center at the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery
Forward Command Post in Dak To ensured the most effective engagement
of ground targets by coordinating the employment of artillery, chemical
strikes, automatic weapons fires, tactical air strikes, and B-52 strikes.
It also ensured the safety of friendly aircraft, troop population
and properly posting air advisories over the air warning coordination
center station, Toll House Lima, and by clearing all fires both tactically
and politically. In order to do this the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery
liaison section was collocated with ARVN Artillery Liaison Officers,
a district representative with power to grant political clearances,
the USAF and RVNAF air liaison officers and parties, 24th Special
Tactical Zone G-3 Air, and 24th Special Tactical Zone G-3(with power
to grant tactical clearances). Within the same Tactical Operations
Center the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery operations and S-2 sections
were located. Through the Fire Support Coordination Center the two
forces were combined and coordinated enabling successful artillery
support to the ground elements located in the area.
(f) The following
assistance was provided during the reporting period in conjunction
with the ARVN assistance program:
(1) A fire direction
center and firing battery assistance team was sent to Dak Seang.
(See Training)
(2) During the
reporting period seventeen RF/PF offensive operations were supported
by U.S. Artillery under control of 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery.
(3) There were
seventy-four defensive targets fired for the villagers in the Dak
To sub sector.
(4) Metro support
was provided to the 37th Artillery (ARVN) and 63rd Artillery (ARVN)
during this reporting period.
(5) Artillery
support has been provided to the 42d ARVN Regiment which is located
at Tan Canh and to other elemnts OPCON to 24th Special Tactical
Zone operating in the Dak To/Ben Het area.
(6) Forward observer
parties have been provided to accompany ARVN maneuver elements on
three operations.
(7) Combined artillery
operations were planned and conducted during the reporting period.
(8) Battery A,
63rd Artillery (ARVN) was provided the use of a bulldozer to prepare
positions at Dak To.
(9) Provided both
maintenance and necessary parts to get ARVN howitzer off deadline.
(10) Provided
tin roofing and other building material for 42nd ARVN Regiment.
(11) Many truckloads
of empty powder cannisters with some building materials were provided
to Dien "Binh and Kon Horing.
(2) Training.
(a) The battalion
had three officers and two enlisted men who attended Forward Observer
School this quarter.
(b) The battalion
had three officers and four enlisted men who attended Forward Direction
Operations School this quarter.
(c) On the job training
continued for personnel in all batteries during the quarter. Emphasis
was on maintenance, fire direction, crew drill and communications.
(d) A class was
conducted for the 299th Engineer Battalion in the adjustment of Artillery
Fire.
(e) Fire direction
and firing battery asistance teams at Dak Seang reported good programs
in training Civilian Irregular Defense Group in Fire Direction Center
and Firing Battery procedures.
(f)
During the
reporting period newly arrived personnel ceased attending the orientation
program taught by members of each battalion and 52nd Artillery Group.
This consists of a four day block of instruction.
d. (C) Logistics:
(1) Battery A moved
198 tons of supplies by helicopter in the Kontum area.
(2) Battery B moved
1740 tons of supplies by helicopter in the Dak To area.
(3) Battery C moved
703 tons of supplies by helicopter in the Plei Trap Valley area.
(4) The battalion
total for supplies moved by air is approximately 2641 tons.
(5) Projects accomplished
were:
(a) Continued efforts
were made in the improvement of the bunker and trench lines in the
base camp area.
(b) An increase
liaison status with the 88th S&S Battalion and the 62nd Maintenance
Battalion was brought into effect and consequently a better, more
efficient support status was established.
(c) The Battalion,
through combined efforts of the Battalion Ammunition Section and the
Battalion S-4 Section, has established a Class I, IV and V resupply
station for all OPCON units in the Dak To/Ben Het area.
(d) The present
time of the year being the monsoon season in the Central Highlands,
an intensified program of waterproofing and drainage improvement was
instituted throughout the battalion. The problems of this nature corollated
with the monsoons has been overcome.
(6) Battery B continues
to rely on air movement of supplies to the fire base. The battery
has established a rear staging area with qualified rigging personnel
to insure that resupply is properly maintained. Battery A is presently
resupplied, partially by road and partially by air, from Oasis. Battery
C is presently resupplied by air from Landing Zone Mary Lou.
(7) Since this battalion
is the only 155mm (towed) battalion capable of being airlifted in
the 52d Artillery Group, it is frequently called upon to assist 52d
Artillery Group and other units in preparing equipment for air movement.
Some of these items rigged and prepared for movement have been radar
equipment, ammunition, rations and barrier materials.
e. Civil Affairs.
(1) Civil Affairs:
The main effort of civil affairs activities of the 1st Battalion,
92nd Artillery was concentrated in the villages and hamlets along
highway 512 and QL-14 in the vicinity of Dak To. The S-5 coordinted
with the Dak To subsector senior advisor, Major Culp, for all civil
affairs activities. During the reporting period civil affairs consisted
of the following.
(2) Nine 2½
t6n truck loads of empty 155mm powder cannisters were delivered to
Dien Binh and Kon Horing for use in building fortification.
(3) The battalion
surgeon and personnel from Headquarters Battery made fourteen MEDCAP
visits during the reporting period, 666 villagers were provided with
general medical care.
(4) United States
newspapers were provided to the senior advisor at Dak To subsector
for distribution to the villagers.
(5) Plastic matting
and tin roofing was provided to Kon Horing and Dien Binh for use in
waterproofing dwellings.
(6) Seventy-four
defensive targets were fired in for villages in the Dak To subsector.
(7) Air items were
loaned to Battery A, 37th Artillery (ARVN) in order to airlift 155mm
howitzers to Fire Support Base 5.
(8) 1000 sandbags
were provided to ARVN Artillery for revertments.
(9) Survey was provided
to ARVN Artillery when requested.
(10) Helicopters
were used to medavac ARVN on several occasions.
(11) Mechanics and
parts were provided for maintenance on several 105mm howitzers (ARVN)
during the reporting period.
(12) The district
medical assistance team, Sgt. Johnson, with Cpt. Jacobs, S-5 1st Battalion,
92nd Artillery, visited the Catholic hospital located at Dak To. The
hospital presently consists of one Swedish doctor and two nurses.
A roll of plastic was presented to the hospital to be used to help
the hospital from the rain. This hospital provides medical aid to
the civilian population located around Dak To. The civilian medical
facilities located in Dak To district consists of one hospital located
at Dak To, one hospital located at Kon Horing and one dispensary located
at Tri Lo. The two hospitals located in Dak To district are operated
by Catholic organizations to provide medical aid to the civilian population.
The dispensarylocated at Tri Lo is run and supported by Vietnamese
Government. The Vietnamese government provides support and assistance
to the Catholic hospitals here in the district. The 1st Battalion,
92nd Artillery will provide assistance in the area of medical aid
through the Tri Lo dispensary for the area served by this facility;
Villages and Hamlets around highway 512 from Fire Support Base 1 to
Dak Roloang. The medical assistance team will provide assistance and
training practices to help upgrade the medical care given by the Vietnamese
medic in the Tri Lo dispensary. The medical team will also conduct
MEDCAPS to the different villages/hamlets which the Tri Lo dispensary
serves.
f. Personnel: Key
personnel changes which took place during the quarter were:
(1) Lieutenant Colonel
Nelson L. Thompson was reassigned to the Washington, D.C. area upon
his departure from the Battalion on 03 July 1969.
(2) Lieutenant Colonel
Clarence L. Stearns assumed command of the Battalion on 03 July 1969.
(3) Captain Joseph
Sasarak, Jr. replaced Captain Bohdan Prehar as Commander of Battery
A, on 12 May 1969. Captain Prehar was reassigned as Senior Liaison
Officer within the battalion.
(4)
The battalion lost through normal rotation or reassignment the services
of nine officers during the reporting period.
(5) The battalion
received eleven new officers during the reporting period.
(6) Personnel in
the battalion received during the reporting period one Legion of Merit
Medal, twenty-fout Bronze Star Medals (fourteen for Valor), one Air
Medal, seventy-five Army Commendation Medals (sixty-seven for Valor)
and eight Purple Hearts.
g. Artillery:
(1) During the quarter,
elements of this battalion made a total of thirteen tactical moves;
ten by road and three by air.
(2) During the reporting
period the battalion fired 41,599 rounds in support of tactical and
pacification operations. In addition, the battalion controlled batteries
which fired 19,214 rounds of light artillery and 7,361 rounds of heavy
artillery.
(3) On 11 June 1969,
Battery B, located at Fire Support Base 6 (YB934187) received a ground
attack at 0445 hours. Surveilance the next morning found 25 enemy
killed in action. There was no penetration of the perimeter by the
enemy force. Battery B fired direct fire in self defense.
(4) During the period,
the platoon from Battery A located at Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het,
received numerous standoff attacks. Counterbattery and counter mortar
fires were directed against these standoff attacks, with significant
results, one of which being that only one man from this Battalion
lost his life during the siege of Ben Het.
h. Other: Visits by
General Officers and other VIP's.
(1) During the quarter
the battalion received twenty-nine visits by VIP's.
(2) A list of visits
by VIP's is attached as Inclosure 2.
2. (C) Section 2,
Lessons Learned: Commander's observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.
a. Personnel: None
b. Operations: Hipshoot
to support counterbattery fires.
(1) Observations:
During a month long period, Dak To was subjected to daily incoming
artillery fire. Enemy locations were quickly obtained and effectively
engaged by friendly artillery. The enemy developed the tactics of
attacking the compound with 122mm rockets, and then when the crews
would man their howitzers to fire counterbattery the enemy would fire
recoiless rifle rounds nto the artillery position areas, thus inflicting
casualties and diminishing the effectiveness of our fires. In order
to allow a portion of the battery to effectively shoot counter battery
fire from Dak To and battery position areas under fire, a platoon
of Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery ws daily sent out to "hipshoot"
positions. Before dark the platoon would return to Dak To. However,
since dusk attacks were common, the platoon would occupy supplementary
positions until after dark, at which time it would return to the battery
postion area.
(2) Evaluation:
The above is an effective means of preserving an accurate and effective
counterbattery capability when the enemy has accurate firing data
on the battery's primary position area. The danger rests in the possibility
of ambush while engaged in road march, and also in the possibility
of a ground attack in the "hipshoot" position where security
is less. These factors must be considered when planning use of this
tactic. Times and places must be changed so that a constant pattern
does not allow the enemy to take advantage of this tactic to attack
the "hipshoot" elements.
(3) Recommendation:
Commanders should carefully consider the use of the above tactic,
as well as others, when it is indicated that a primary position area
is "zeroed in" butg for some reason cannot be significantly
relocated.
c. Operations: Ambush
by Artillery:
(1) Observation:
Reconnaissance teams have discovered enemy roads which are heavily
travelled by enemy convoys, but have been unable to attack these convoys
by ground because of insufficient forces or by air because of weather
or other limitations. An effective means of engaging these targets
has been to adjust on two ends of a roadrunner along a straight portion
of the road, to alert the artillery to be loaded and ready when a
convoy is known to be approaching, and to call for the road runner
to be fired when the convoy is in the killing zone. The most effective
method has been to wait until the middle of the convoy is in the center
of the roadrunner, and then to simultaneously begin firing from both
ends towards the middle.
(2) Evaluation:
This method of attack has proven very effective in actual use and
has resulted in the destruction of many enemy trucks.
(3) Recommendation:
It is recommended that the above method of attack be used along enemy
roads or trails whenever ground or air attacks cannot be utilized
and also in conjunction with ground and air attacks.
d. Operations: Air
advisories for B-52 Strikes:
(1) Observations:
Warnings of impending B-52 strikes are usually broadcast on the "on
guard" frequency USAF. However, during combined operations in
which a great amount of Tactical Air and Army Aviation as well as
B-52 strikes were used, it was found that many aircraft would miss
the air advisories because of inability to monitor the correct frequency
while working on others. This problem was solved at the Combined Fire
Support Coordination Center by having the advisory broadcasted not
only on "on guard" but also by the Air Warning Coordination
Center (Tollhouse Lima) station and the ALO (Both Colocated).
(2) Evaluation:
After initiating the multiple broadcasting of advisories there were
no reports of aircraft missing the warning of impending B-52 strikes
and being endangered by proximity to the strike. This was a pragmatic
solution to an existing problem.
(3) Recommendation:
When the prescribed means of disseminating warnings is not effectively
alerting everyone required, alternate means of dissemination must
be discovered. Collocation of air, artillery, and fire support coordination
elements facilitates finding the best combination of alternatives.
e. Operations: Use
of smoke and high explosive in suppression for aerial resupply.
(1) Observations:
During the month of June 1969 Ben Het was surrounded by large numbers
of well armed and well dug-in NVA. The enemy had the firing data for
the airfield and for all established helicopter pads. When an aircraft
attempted to land it not only received small arms and automatic weapons
fire, but immediately upon landing it ws subjected to mortar and recoiless
rifle fire. Because the road to Ben Het was effectively cut by large
NVA forces, aerial resupply was essential. In order to counter the
enemy's accurate and effective fires, it was necessary to:
(a) Select the most
likely enemy firing positions upon which the suppressive fires would
be delivered.
(b) Select the best
locations for screening the enemy's observation and lay down a smoke
screen by both artillery and air delivery.
(c) Select alternate
sites upon which to land. All available artillery was employed, therefore
close coordination was necessary. Among other things a corridor had
to be given to the aircraft, and the controller had to be capable
of instantly turning the suppression on and off.
(2) Evaluation:
The use of smoke and high explosive suppressive fires to gether with
a change of LZ's proved extremely effective. The intensity and accuracy
of the enemy's fires were greatly reduced. No aircraft were shot down
or seriously damaged by ground fire while this program was being employed.
A requirement to maintain the effectiveness of this program is that
the points of impact be changed often enough that the enemy cannot
detect the tactic by a simple relocation.
(3) Recommendation:
When the enemy is within mortar and recoiless rifle range of a landing
zone, suppressive fires whould be fired utilizing both high explosive
and smoke in order to keep the enemy "holed up" and blinded.
If the established landing zone is "zeroed in", alternate
landing zones should be used.
Clarence L. Stearns
Lieutenant
Colonel, FA
2 Incl Commanding
1. Unit Organizational
Chart
2. General
Officers and VIP Visits
DISTRIBUTION:
2 CINCUSARPAC
3 CG, USARV
6 CO, 52d
Arty Gp
INCLOSURE 1
ORGANIZATIONAL
CHART
1st Battalion, 92d Artillery
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INCLOSURE 2
General
Officer and VIP Visits
1. 01
May 1969
a. Major General
David S. Parker, Commanding General, USARV Engineers.
b. Visited
Battery A Platoon located at Fire Base 12 (ZB871256).
2. 05 May 1969
a. Lieutenant General
Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Major
General Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited Battalion Tactical Operatons Center.
c. Briefed
on combined operaton in the Dak To/Ben Het area.
3. 11 May 1969
a. Lieutenant General
Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Brigadier
General Alvin Irzych, 4DC, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited
Battalion Tactical Operations Center.
c. Briefed
by Battalion Commander on current operations.
4. 13 May 1969
a. Lieutenant General
Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Major
General Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited
Battalion Tactical Operations Center.
c. Briefed
on Artillery support for current operation.
5. 15 May 1969
a. General William
R. Rosson, Deputy Commanding General MACV; Brigadier General Winant
Sidle, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited
Dak To.
c. Briefed
on the current tactical situation of 24th Special Tactical Zone.
6. 19 May 1969
a. Major General
Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited
Fire Support Base 3.
c. Briefed
on current plans to include arclights.
7. 22 May 1969
a. Major General
Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.
b. Visited
Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed
on current situation.
8. 23 May 1969
a. Brigadier General
James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps.
b. Visited
Battalion Tactical Operations Center at Dak To, Fire Support Base
6 and Fire Support Base 5.
c. Breifed
on current tactical situation in Dak To/Ben Het area and artillery
support at the Fire Bases.
9. 26 May 1969
a. Major General
Joseph R. Russ, Deputy Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam,
Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps.
b. Battalion
Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Breifed
on tactical situation and new operations in the Ben Het area.
10. 27 May 1969
a. Major General
Donn R. Pepke, Commanding General, 4th Infanty Division.
b. Battalion
Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed
on tactical situation and the status of 24th Special Tactical Zone
operation Dan Cuyen 38A.
11. 30
May 1969
a. General Creighton
W. Abrams, Commanding General USARV.
b. Battalion
Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed
on tactical situation and current status of 24th Special Tactical
Zone operation Dan Cuyen 38A.
12. 01 June 1969
a. Major General
Joseph R. Russ, Deputy Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam,
Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps.
b. Battalion
Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed
by Battalion Commander on tactical situation.
13. 02 June 1969
a. Brigadier General
Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited
Fire Support Base 1, Dak To.
c. Attended
a demonstration on the AN/PPS-5 Radar.
14. 05 June 1969
a. Major General
Joseph R. Russ, Deputy Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam,
Brigadier General James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed
on tactical situation and problems of enemy rocketing of Dak To.
15. 07 June 1969
a. Marvin Miller,
better known as Michael Anthony, star of television program "The
Millionaire".
b. 1st Battalion,
92nd Artillery Base Camp, Pleiku, RVN.
c. Gave out
checks and visited with the personnel of the unit.
16. 09 June 1969
a. Brigadier General
Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited
Fire Support Base 1, Dak To.
c. Looked
at artillery area and briefed on tactical situation.
17. 14 June 1969
a. General William
B. Rosson, Deputy Commanding General, MACV.
b. Dak To.
c. Briefed
on update of current tactical situation of 24th Special Tactical Zone
operation.
18. 18 June 1969
a. Brigadier General
Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Battalion
Tactical Operations Center at Dak To.
c. Presented
awards and was briefed on situation in Dak To/Ben Het areas.
19. 19 June 1969
a. Lieutenant General
Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam.
b. Battalion
Tactical Operations Center at Dak To.
c. Briefed
and given short tour of the facilities and operation at Dak To.
20. 22 June 1969
a. Major General
Lu Lan, Commanding General II Corps, Brigadier General James S. Timothy,
Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps.
b. Battalion Tactical Operations Center Dak To, RVN.
c. Briefed
on tactical situation at Dak To/Ben Het and had lunch in Artillery
mess hall.
21. 24 June 1969
a. Brigadier General
Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Battalion
Tactical Operations Center Dak To.
c. Briefed
on use of Artillery around Ben Het and arclight request.
22. 25 June 1969
a. Brigadier General
James S. Timothy, Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps, Brigadier General
Winant Sidle, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Dak To Tactical Operations Center.
c. Briefed
on current situation.
23. 26 June 1969
a. Lieutenant General
Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam.
b. Dak To
Tactical Operations Center.
c. Briefed
on current situation in 24th Special Tactical Zone.
24. 29 June 1969
a. General William
B. Rosson, Deputy Commanding General MACV, Lieutenant General Charles
A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam, Major General
Lu Lan, Commanding General, II Corps, Brigadier General James S. Timothy,
Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps.
b. Visited Dak To and Ben Het.
c. Briefed
on the search and destroy operation Cuyet Thang 1, and discussed the
status of artillery units at Ben Het.
25. 01 July 1969
a. Lieutenant General
Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam.
b. Visited
Fire Support Base 1.
c. Briefed
on enemy activities at Fire Support Base 24 and covered current class
V status and management.
26. 02 July 1969
a. Brigadier General
Albert E. Hunter, Commanding General Qui Nhon Support Command.
b. Fire Support Base 1.
c. Briefed
on resupply of ammunition and rations.
27. 03 July 1969
a. Senator Stevens
from Alaska, Senator Bellmon from Oklahoma, Brigadier General Winant
Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited
Dak To and Ben Het.
c. Briefed
on current tactical situation of the 24th Special Tactical Zone.
28. 04 July 1969
a. Lieutenant General
Charles A. Corcoran, Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam.
b. Ben Het.
c. Received
update briefing on Queyet Thang III.
29. 19 July 1969
a. Brigadier General
Winant Sidle, Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery.
b. Visited
Fire Support Base 12, Ben Het.
c. Inspected
the status of engineer projects in progress at Ben Het.
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