1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, 525.15.

2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:
               VERNE L. BOWERS
                Major General, USA
                The Adjutant General

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws (Title 18,U.S.C., sections 793 and 794), the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

2 Incl
1. DAFD-OTT 711007
2. DAFD-OTT 711008
DISTRIBUTION:
Commanding Generals
US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Material Command

Commandants
US Army Aviation School
US Army Field Artillery School

Copies furnished: Office, Chief of Staff, US Army (DWSA)
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development

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1. (U) Defense of Medium and Heavy Artillery Bases:

   In medium and heavy artillery batteries where Flechetta Anti-Personnel Rounds (Bee-Hive) are not available, it has been found that firing HE with a minimum burst time setting(Killer Junior) had the best effect, - both physical and psychological - for Defensive Fires. To insure their effectivness, instruction should be given to each howitzer section on targets located at different ranges, also, on shooting not only on level ground but on slopes. Placing a range card showing quadrants and fuse settings, in each section will also enhance the results.

2. (U) Artillery Movement Along Unsecured Roads.

   In moving self-propelled batteries along unsecured roads, it was found that main losses came not from active enemy activities but from mines. Not only must the road be swept prior to movement, but also a careful watch must be kept for freshly emplaced mines during movement. A method that helped in this respect was to use a helicopter at low level, to blow dust off of the road, revealing fresh mine emplacements. Because of mines, it was not practical even with armored cavalry providing security, to resupply remote firebases by convoy. Enough supplies can be carried in on the initial insertion to allow resupply by CH-47, on an as needed basis. This would release units, that would normally be used for resupply convoys, for other missions.

3. (U) Change in Mission for a Medium Artillery Battery.

   The mission of medium artillery batteries in the Republic of Vietnam (with some exceptions in the Mech Units)is General Reinforcing or General Support. When used in the direct support role instead of the normal direct support artillery, additional burdens are placed on all concerned. The Medium Artillery's TO&E does not provide for LNO's or FO's for this type of mission. If the FO's from the normal DS battery are used they are often reluctant to call in close fires when needed, as they are unfamiliar with the effects, and many times use more rounds than would normally be used to accomplish the mission. The forward observer needed, in mostcases, additional training in the use of medium artillery and the effects that they achieved. The use of medium artillery in the DS role, in support of Infantry does not provide the most effective utilization of the artillery's firepower. The normal reinforcing mission is more appropriate and should be adhered to, if at all possible, when light artillery is available.

4. (U) Disposition of LNO's and FO's

   During Stand Down When a field artillery unit is standing down, the continued effective utilization of LNO's and FO's to supported units becomes a problem. Should another artillery unit be designated to take over the mission, the LNO's and FO's should be reassigned to the new artillery unit. In doing this, there will be minimum of confusion and operational time lost. It was found that an LNO or an FO could be cleared, reassigned and back on the job in 48 hours. The remaining LNO's and FO's were able to provide support during this period an there was minimum operational loss.

5. Emplacement of Sensor Devices in Heavy Jungle:

   When sensor devices (duffel bag) were first employed in the Central Highlands as an early warning system, they were dropped from an aircraft (helicopter) and their location was then plotted on a map from the air. When it then became desirable for the duffel bag strings to be more accurately located, they were dropped from an aircraft, but this time a MPQ-4 Radar employing a double beam scan was used to give grid coordinates that would be effective up to 50 meters. Both methods proved ineffective however; for the first relied principally on the viewers ability to read a map, and the second because the radar picked up only 62% of the sensors that were dropped. Therefore, it was determined that in order for the duffel bag program to be effective each position would have to be surveyed. Because of the extensive amount of time and the sizeable security force that was needed to emplace the system using a traverse method, an alternative method had to be used that would ensure an acceptable accuracy, and reduce the time required and security element needed for traverse.
    Hence, it was determined that a triangulation method would be used; first the proposed sensor locations were plotted on a map; second the survey team went out and taped six (6) bases long enough so that the end points would ensure an acceptable apex angle; third, the duffle bag accompanied the three (3) APC's manuvered through the jungle to start laying out their strings. On reaching a point where a sensor was to be emplaced, the emplacing personnel would notify the survey team by radio, then the T-16 theodolites that were set up at each end of the appropriate base would move to the general area. A pinflare was then fired throug the jungle so that the theodolite could better locate the sensor. Then a hand flare was fired. After recording that reading, a second hand flare was fired another reading location and the procedure was repeated, until all strings were emplaced. Total time to emplace sensors using this method was eleven (11) days in which twenty-four (24) strings, five (5) sensors per string, were emplaced.

              LOWELL G. SMITH
              LTC, FA
              COMMANDING  

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

BILLY M. WALKER
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, FA
ADJUTANT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters United States Army Forces, Military Region 2
APO San Francisco, 96350

AVFA-GC        3rd Ind          (Stamped) 21 JUN 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Battalion, 16 Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-3)(U)

Commanding Officer
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHDO-DO
APO 96375

This headquarters, has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SIDNEY CORNETT
MAJ. AGC
Assistant AG

AVGG-FAB-OP (30 Apr 71) 1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Battalion, 16th Field Artillery for period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3)

DA, Hq, 52nd Artillery Group, APO 96350, 8 May 1971

THRU: Commanding Officer, SRAC Artillery, APO 96350

TO: ACSFOR, DA, Washington, DC, 20310

Subject reports have been reviewed and are approved.

JAMES M. WROTH
COL, FA
Commanding

AVHDO-DO (30 Apr 71) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery For Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS: CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:                     Clarence E. Parks Jr 1LT
5/16th Arty                FOR: L HONSOWETZ
SRAC                        CPT. AGC
                               Assistant Adjutant General

GPOP-FD (30 Apr 71) 5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 16th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT. AGCC
Asst AG

AVGG-FA-OP                      5 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

Blank until lower portion of page

2. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) Gunship Employment

(a) Observation: Gunships were effectively employed at the beginning of the battle by the 1-92nd LNO. Once the situation became critical, personnel from various other agencies attempted to control the aircraft, leading to more confusion. (See after action report on battle of Phu Nhon, attached).

(b) Evaluation: Gunships were not used to their fullest due to the lack of control and coordination This likewise hindered the employment of artillery.

(c) Recomendations: That an overall fire support coordinator be appointed by the highest head- quarters involved in the operation. His team should include both U.S. and Vietnamese artillery, army aviation and Air Force personnel.

(d) Command Action: Discussions were held with representatives of Pleiku Sector, II Corps, and the 20th Engineer Battalion to effect coordination, but to little avail.

(2) U.S. Artillery:

(a) Observation: The Vietnamese per- sonnel initially were reluctant to use U.S. artillery fire support.

(b) Evaluation: The tactical situation grew critical when perhaps contact could have been broken by the use of artillery fires.

(c) Recommendations: That Vietnamese personnel be made aware of the support available to them and the effectiveness it can produce prior to the initiation of such actions.

(d) Command Action: Liaison officers and forward observers from this unit were kept with Vietnamese units, and were eventually able to show what we could do for them.

(3) Perimeter Security:

(a) Obersavation: Our defense of Phu Nhon was successful primarily because of adherence to the basics of position defense, specifically having alert guards and deep, simple fox holes, which allowed good grazing fire.

(b) Evaluation: More effort should be spent in keeping guard per- sonnel alert and motivated than in constructing elaborate, extensive defensive barriers around positions.

(c) Recommendation: Methods of keeping guards alert be stressed in perimeter defense classes.

(d) Command Action: This battalion has in effect the following procedures to assist in developing and maintaining guard alertness:

   (1) Guards are briefed on the current enemy situation at guardmount.
   (2) Soup and Coffee are delivered to guards through- out the night.
   (3) The OD checks each perimeter position hourly.
   (4) Commo checks are made with each perimeter position hourly.

d. Organizations: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics: None

g. Comunications:

(1) Equipment status:

(a) Observation: When the battalion is spread out as far as we have been in our support mission, communications with the more distant firing positions is virtually impossible.

(b) Evaluation: More communications equipment is needed to allow us to perform our jobs at optimum effectiveness in such an extended configuration. Current TOEs are unrealistic considering the situation.

(c) Recommendations: That Corps- or Army-wide facility be estab lished from which units may draw required non-TOE or above TOE communications equipment. This facility should be under the direct control of the Corps (Field Force) Operations section When missions are assigned, the equipment needed to perform them can be provided.

(d) Command Action: The battalion borrowed additional equipment from our support agencies and neighboring units to meet our requirements, pending submission of a request to change the TOE.

h. Material: None

i. Other: None

JOHN S. CHESBRO
LTC, FA
Commanding

2 Incl

1. List of locations
2. After Action Report of Battle of Phu Nhon

AVFA-AT-D (5 MAY 71) 2nd Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, Second Regional Assistance Command Artillery, ATTN: AVFA-AT-D, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, Second Regional Assistance Command, APO 96350

This headquarters has evaluated subject ORLL and for- warding indorsement and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

BILLY M. WALKER
Lieutenant Colonel
Adjutant

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters United States Army Forces, Military Region 2
APO 96350 AVFA-GC 3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

Commanding Officer
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHDO-DO
APO 96375

This headquarters, has reviewed the attached report, considers it adequate and concurs with the contents.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L.D. PENCE
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

AVGG-FAA-OP (5 May 71) 1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3)

DA, Hq, 52nd Artillery Group, APO 96318, 8 May 71

THRU: Commanding Officer, SRAC Artillery, APO 96350 TO: ACSFOR, DA, Washington, DC, 20310

Subject reports have been reviewed and are approved.

JAMES M. WROTH
COL, FA
Commanding

AVHDO-DO (5 May 71) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report -Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 92nd Field Artillery and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Clarence E. PARKS JR.
1LT For F.L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

GPOP-FD (5 May 71) 5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 92nd Field Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

L.M. OZAKI
CPT. AGC
Asst AG

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Attach Form DD 1473

AVGG-FAA-OP                      5 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR-65 (R-3) (U)

The coordinates of locations occupied by the 1st Battalion, 92nd Artillery are listed below:

LOCATION                         COORDINATES
Artillery Hill                           ZA 228536
FSB Sarah II                         ZA 111677
LZ Weigt Davis                      AR 896113
FSB 6                                  YB 935189
FSB 12                                YB 869256
FSB Kelly                              ZA 228535
FSB Athena                          AR 775904
LZ Blackhawk                        BR 035536
LZ Miller                               AQ 870988
Polei Krong                           ZA 110911
LZ Lonely                            AQ 852871
LZ Action                            BR 262470
RSB Schueller                       BR 367468
RSB Buffalo                          BR 479434
FSB Crystal                          BR 899662
FSB Dragon                          ZA 229537
FSB Pony                             BR 806832
FSB John Henry                     BR 676708
Camp Fidel                           BR 898405
FSB Mars                             BR 897550

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